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Relationships v Relatedness in family Justice 
Judith Masson* 
Law School, University of Bristol, UK 
The Court of Appeal’s decision in Re W corrects misunderstandings that there are rights or 
presumptions which govern court decisions about children and criticises the simplistic application of 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Re B (2013). It raises important questions about: the meaning of 
welfare and the continued relevance of status quo in decision-making; how ECHR art 8 should shape 
litigation in private family law; delay in adoption proceedings; how errors in the system are created, 
detected and avoided; and the role of the court in promoting agreements. 
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In Re W [2016] EWCA Civ 793, the Court of Appeal allowed an appeal by prospective adopters (Mr 
and Mrs X) against a decision by Bodey J, refusing their adoption application and granting a special 
guardianship order (SGO) to grandparents, who had never met the two year old child, A. Readers 
with understanding of attachment theory and knowledge of the effects of breaking attachments will 
be alarmed at the original decision. Those steeped in the principles of the Children Act 1989, which 
is drafted to restrict interference in families by court applications may wonder how the lower court 
got into this position. However, anyone who has followed the development of case law will be aware 
that thinking and practice in the family justice system has been re-oriented since the decisions of Re 
B [2013] UKSC 33 and Re B-S [2013] EWCA Civ 1146.  
Re W raises important questions about: the meaning of welfare and the continued relevance of 
status quo in decision-making; how ECHR art 8 should shape litigation in private family law; delay in 
adoption proceedings; how errors in the system are created, detected and avoided; and the role of 
the court in promoting agreements. 
Lord Justice McFarlane, who gave the main  judgment with which Jackson and Lindblom LJJ agreed, 
found Bodey J’s decision ‘fatally flawed’ (para 63) because he had accepted and relied on 
‘inadequate’ evidence  from the children’s guardian and Independent Social Worker (ISW) which was 
based on a misunderstanding of the law. He also criticised the judge’s failure to recognise the 
relevance of human rights (para 77) and the way the case had been conducted, which left the court 
with no knowledge of A as a person. The case was remitted for rehearing by Cobb J, with a clear 
indication that advocates should present human rights arguments. Lord Justice Jackson expressed a 
hope that the parties would compromise (para 95). 
In private law decisions, the established arrangements for the child, referred to as the ‘status quo’, 
have long held magnetic importance, revealed in empirical research (Eekelaar and Clive  1977) and 
justified in case law (D v M (Minor: Custody Appeal) [1982] 3 All ER 897). McFarlane LJ discussed the 
status quo argument, repeating passages from his  leading judgment in Re M’ P-P [2015] EWCA Civ 
584, where the Court of Appeal overturned a decision to remove children from their long-term 
foster carer/ prospective adoptive parent and grant  a SGO to their aunt. He noted that it was not 
usually relevant in public law cases but was reflected in the welfare checklists,  in Children Act 1989, 
s.1(3)(c), the effect of change, and Adoption of Children Act 2002, s.1(4)(f), the likelihood and  value 
                                                          
*Email: Judith.Masson@bristol.ac.uk 
 
of continuing relationships.  In this way attachment theory, the importance of children’s attachment 
to their primary carers for development and well-being was firmly accepted and acknowledged in 
law.  
While it is true that shorter care proceedings mean fewer children are in long-established 
placements at the final hearing, this is not the case for adoption proceedings. One effect of Re B-S 
has been to lower the bar for leave to oppose adoption. Munby P stated correctly that ‘mere 
passage of time cannot be determinative’ (para 74 (vii)). However, where the ultimate question is 
whether the child should live with the adopters or someone else, the length and depth of 
attachments can be decisive. Also, applications for leave like that of the grandparents will 
necessarily involve consideration of disruption to the child’s attachments, (CA 1989,s.10(9)(c)) and 
about the likely success of the substantive application. From this perspective, granting leave to the 
grandparents was questionable. 
McFarlane LJ drew a distinction with fostering because ‘a firm and secure attachment is not one of 
the primary aims of the placement’ (para 64). This is too simplistic. Good fostering practice stresses 
the importance of ‘a secure base’ for children (Schofield and Beek 2014) and long-term fostering is a 
permanency option (DfE 2015, 2.4). Some carers cannot afford to become special guardians or 
adopters. The nature of the care arrangement matters, not its label. There was an invaluable 
relationship between the carer and the children in Re M’P-P long before she was approved to adopt 
either of them. 
Both the children’s guardian and the ISW worked from the assumption that if a relative was willing 
and able to care for a child, the child had a right to be placed with them. Their thinking infected 
Bodey J’s decision. McFarlane LJ was determined to put an end to such views.  There was no right to 
or presumption/ assumption of placement in the ‘natural family’ (paras 70-71). The pro and cons of 
each option must be assessed in terms of the child’s welfare. Baroness Hale’s phrase, ‘nothing else 
will do’ (Re B, para 215) was ‘meaningless, and potentially dangerous’ (para 68) not a ‘hyperlink’ to 
the outcome without such assessment.  It provided a distillation of the proportionality and necessity 
tests, and should only be deployed after the balancing exercise. 
Counsel for the adopters prepared a written submission: ’to allow an application to prevent an 
adoption where a child has spent sufficient time with her adoptive family that she views them as her 
only and permanent family is contrary to public policy and in breach of the human rights of the child 
and the adoptive parents’ but accepted the court’s suggestion not to proceed orally with this 
’adventurous’ approach (paras 61-2). Nevertheless, McFarlane LJ’s judgment included some 
discussion of it. His style was elliptical as if he did not want to nail his colours to the mast but 
recognised its strength. He appeared to accept that allowing applications in such circumstances 
could be a breach of public policy /human rights (para 64) but was not prepared to hold the Children 
Act 1989 incompatible with the Convention.  However, he found ‘beyond question’ that ‘family life’ 
now existed between A and the Xs and must be respected and, more tentatively, that these were 
the only article 8 rights in play (paras 79-80) but left further analysis and the implications to Cobb J. 
Where the only art 8 rights in question are held by the prospective adoptive family, the court’s leave 
for others to seek orders, which could undermine those rights is an interference in family life, which 
can only be justified within article 8(2). This is reflected in the leave provisions in Children Act 1989, 
s.10. Parents, step-parents and (long-term) carers do not need leave because they have ‘family life’ 
with the child, others must qualify under s.10(9). Unless the intervention, leave for private law 
proceedings, is proportionate the family’s human rights are breached. On this analysis, the court 
should not have allowed the grandparents to make their SGO application. 
The Xs’ adoption application should have been unproblematic even though three months after it was 
filed, and in response to the standard notification letter, the father indicated an intention to oppose, 
as did the grandparents. The father could not have shown change of circumstances (ACA 2002, 
s.47(7)), he was involved in care proceedings relating to his second child. The grandparents had no 
right to oppose (para 9); they needed leave to apply for a SGO (ACA 2002, s. 29(5)) and had to give 
notice to the local authority three months beforehand (CA 1989, s. 14(7)). Rather than determine 
the Xs’ application, the court managed the process to facilitate the grandparent’s challenge; whether 
this was deliberate, due to a shortage of hearing time or because adoption applications are not given 
priority was not explained. The consequences for the Xs, A and the grandparents has been a year of 
stressful litigation, which is not yet over, mostly at public expense; the hard-pressed court system 
has  used up resources needed for other cases. This is a clear example of delay creating work and 
causing injustice. Adoption proceedings should be time-tabled to be completed in 20 weeks. 
The decision-making at first instance was riddled with errors: The grandparents were treated as if 
they could apply to oppose the adoption; the potential harm to A by their application for leave was 
evidently not considered. The children’s guardian prepared a report as if the court was only 
considering an uncontested CAO application, and without meeting the adopters or the child. The 
ISW instructed for the special guardian assessment founded her conclusions on an error of law and 
without knowledge of A as an individual. Neither ‘expert’ referred to the adoption checklist in their 
reports nor completed a Re B-S assessment.  Bodey J failed to see these inadequacies and preferred 
their views over those of  adoption social worker who had been working with the family for almost 
two years because of their independence and greater experience (para 59). Even McFarlane LJ 
rejected counsel’s argument because of Bodey J’s experience. Such errors occur because individuals 
assume they know the right answers to complex problems or apply heuristics to find an answer 
quickly. An increase in cases places pressure on professionals and courts so they behave in this 
‘sloppy’ way. The solution lies not in lists of guidance but interdisciplinary knowledge and 
professional challenge, and in reducing applications, for example by refusing leave. 
It is not surprising that Jackson LJ hoped the dispute could be resolved by agreement (Jackson, 
2009). However, civil cases are vastly different; a money claim would not have challenged King 
Solomon’s wisdom. Neither couple had any choice but to use the courts to obtain a legal relationship 
with A. The court had foisted this dispute on the Xs, but not given them the power to resolve it. 
Withdrawing their application would not safeguard A’s welfare. Post adoption contact relationships 
are complex and difficult to sustain (Neil et al 2014), litigation over full time care is an unlikely basis 
for success. In a context where judges have questioned whether parents can ever truly consent to 
their children being looked after (CA 1989, s.20), judges must be careful not to pressurise parties 
rather than make decisions. 
Family cases resolve (or not) individual claims, they also indicate the current climate in family justice. 
Re W demonstrates that the stormy period heralded by Re B, has not yet resolved into clear skies. 
The lightning flashes from the Supreme Court have obscured the value of adoption and fog and 
hailstones from the Court of Appeal have made it hard to find the way. The adults and children 
exposed to these storms have suffered most. 
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